Mobile Application Testing
Evaluate mobile apps and connected APIs for insecure data flows and client-side abuse paths.
View service detailsIoT & Embedded Security · Central Illinois
Connected products fail differently from software. The threat model includes someone who bought your device, opened it, attached probes to the debug header, dumped the flash, and extracted the credentials you shipped to every unit. We test the device, the radio, the firmware, the update mechanism, and the cloud behind it as one system.
IoT security testing covers the full product ecosystem rather than one component. That means the physical device and its circuit board, the firmware running on it, the protocols it speaks over the air and over the wire, the companion mobile or web application, and the cloud services that tie a fleet of devices to a fleet of user accounts. Weaknesses in connected products are almost always about how those pieces trust each other.
We begin at the hardware. Boards get opened, components identified, and debug interfaces located — UART, JTAG, and SWD headers are frequently present and frequently unlocked on shipping hardware. Where they are not, flash memory can often be read directly off the chip. Either route usually produces the firmware image, and the firmware image usually produces the keys.
The finding that matters most in this space is shared secrets. A single hardcoded credential or a signing key embedded in firmware does not compromise one device — it compromises every unit you have ever shipped, and there is no patch that fixes the ones already in the field. Update integrity is the close second: if firmware updates are unsigned or delivered over cleartext, an attacker who can reach the device can own it permanently.
Hardware cannot be hotfixed. A key baked into a production run is in the field for the life of the product, so pre-production testing is worth several times what post-launch testing is worth.
A compromised connected device is a foothold inside somebody else's network, which makes your product their supply chain risk and their security team's problem to escalate to you.
The EU Cyber Resilience Act, the US Cyber Trust Mark, and sector-specific medical and industrial requirements all expect documented security assessment of connected products.
Locks, cameras, medical devices, industrial actuators, and vehicle components carry consequences that do not appear on a CVSS confidentiality axis.
Reference designs and vendor SDKs ship with default credentials, debug services, and test interfaces that nobody removed for production. This is extremely common.
Every engagement follows the same documented arc. The percentages below describe how testing time is typically distributed — the balance shifts with what we find, but the phases do not change.
We agree on the device variants in scope and how many units we need. Some units will not survive — flash removal and rework are destructive — so we ask for sacrificial hardware alongside working units, plus any documentation the manufacturer will share.
The enclosure comes off and the board gets characterized. We identify the processor, memory, and radio modules, then hunt for the interfaces the manufacturer used during development and did not remove from production hardware.
Firmware is unpacked and read. We recover the filesystem, review the binaries, and search for the things that should never have shipped: private keys, API tokens, hardcoded passwords, debug backdoors, and libraries that stopped receiving patches years ago.
With the firmware understood, we attack the device as a live system. Radio traffic is captured and replayed, the update path is subverted, and the cloud API is tested for the cross-account and cross-device flaws that turn one compromised unit into fleet-wide access.
Findings are separated by where the fix lives — silicon configuration, firmware, protocol design, or cloud — and by whether they are fixable in the field. A hardcoded key in shipped hardware is a different conversation from a server-side authorization bug, and the report frames it that way.
Auditors, insurers, and enterprise security reviewers all ask which methodology a test followed. These are the published frameworks our process is built on, and the report names them explicitly.
A human writes your report. Not a scanner export with a cover page, and not a template with your logo dropped into it.
We quote a fixed fee after a short scoping call. No hourly billing, no change orders mid-engagement. These are the variables that move the number:
Most device assessments run 10 to 20 business days of active testing, with the report 5 to 10 business days later — roughly 5 to 8 weeks end to end. Hardware work is less predictable than software work; a locked debug interface that forces chip-off extraction can add several days on its own.
Cost tracks the number of device models, whether debug interfaces are locked, how many radio protocols are involved, and whether the companion app and cloud API are included as full assessments. We scope after seeing the product, since a board photo answers questions that a specification sheet does not.
Three to five units, with at least one designated sacrificial. Chip removal and board rework are destructive by nature. We start with non-destructive techniques and only escalate when necessary, but you should expect at least one unit not to survive.
No. Attackers do not have them, so a black-box assessment reflects the real threat. Schematics and source do reduce the reconnaissance time, which means more of the window is spent finding issues rather than locating test points — so we take them when you can share them.
Before, with a wide margin. Hardware findings such as unlocked debug interfaces, missing secure boot, or a shared key baked into every unit are extremely expensive to fix after a production run and impossible to fix in devices already installed. Pre-production testing on engineering samples is the highest-value point in the product lifecycle.
Yes, and we recommend it. Most connected products are compromised through the cloud API rather than the device, because the API is what lets one compromised unit reach other customers' devices. The device, the app, and the cloud form one trust chain and testing them in isolation misses the flaws between them.
Evaluate mobile apps and connected APIs for insecure data flows and client-side abuse paths.
View service detailsAnalyze API endpoints for authorization flaws, data exposure, and abuse opportunities.
View service detailsAssess internet-facing assets to identify exploitable weaknesses before attackers do.
View service detailsTell us what you are trying to prove and to whom. A twenty-minute scoping call is usually enough to determine which engagement answers the question, and we will say so if the answer is a cheaper one.